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This paper attempts to draw attention to the role of persuasive authority in the 
law, by providing a critical review of Frederick Schauer’s influential account of 
persuasive authorities as optional authorities. Although recognizing that Schauer 
highlights some important features of the notion, it is argued that, as long as his 
interpretation leaves no room for theoretical authority in the law, it fails to account 
properly for one of the main roles of persuasive authorities, namely, to provide 
future courts with reasons to distinguish their case from previous court’s decisions. 
It is also suggested that persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical 
authorities providing practical reasons. The article concludes with some final 
remarks on the consequences of the adopted view for our understanding of the 
law in general. 
Keywords Jurisprudence, Argumentation, Precedents, Persuasive Authority, Non-
Binding Precedents.
Raciocinando com precedentes 
persuasivos: o papel da 
autoridade persuasiva no Direito
Este artigo tenta chamar a atenção sobre o papel da autoridade persuasiva na lei, 
fornecendo uma revisão crítica da influente explicação de Frederick Schauer de 
autoridades persuasivas como autoridades opcionais. Embora reconhecendo que 
Schauer destaca algumas características importantes da noção, argumenta-se que, 
enquanto sua interpretação não deixa espaço para a autoridade teórica na lei, 
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Although binding precedents have always drawn the attention of 
legal scholars in the common-law tradition, the role of persuasive 
precedents has usually been overlooked in comparison with their 
binding counterpart2. This lack of attendance is not universal, and 
there have been many important recent contributions in the field3. 
However, as Chad Flanders has rightly noted, most of the literature 
fails to treat persuasive precedents as an independent subject of 
study “in its own right”4. Persuasive precedents are still viewed as 
precedents only in a “loose” meaning of the term, compared to the 
“strict” use of the word when applied to binding precedents5. The 
very fact that they are usually referred to simply as non-binding 
precedents is a clear indicator of the residual character usually 
attributed to persuasive precedents.
1  For helpful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for 
Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea. I am only too aware that I have not always followed their advice. I 
am also grateful to Cláudio Michelon and his course “Reasoning With Precedent” at the University 
of Edinburgh, for encouraging me to think and write on this subject. This paper was written while 
studying at the University of Edinburgh with funding provided by CONICYT - PFCHA/Concurso para 
Becas de Magíster en el Extranjero 2016 (73170364). 
2  This lack of attention to non-binding precedents has been noted, for instance, by 
BRONAUGH, 1987, p. 217: “Academic writers, it need hardly be observed, take interest only 
in the binding sort [of precedent], and the other is treated with a indifference”. See also 
FLANDERS, 2009, p. 56: “Very little has been said to explicate the very idea of persuasive 
authority itself, in its own right”. More recently, see LAMOND, 2010, p. 16: “It is universally 
accepted that many such considerations [i. e., persuasive precedents] do play a role, and an 
important one, in understanding the content of common law doctrines, but there are few 
corresponding accounts on the way in which they play that role.” 
3  See, for example, BRONAUGH, 1987; GLENN, 1987; SCHAUER, 2008; FLANDERS, 2009; 
LAMOND, 2010. For a recent attempt to make sense of precedents – binding and non-binding alike 
– in the context of analogical reasoning in the law, see DUARTE D’ALMEIDA; MICHELON, 2016.
4  FLANDERS, 2009, p. 56 and p. 57. Chad FLANDERS notes two contemporary debates in which 
the idea of persuasive authorities is present as a collateral discussion: the debate over the 
citation of foreign authorities, and the discussion on the nature of judicial authority in general. 
See FLANDERS, 2009, pp. 57-58.
5  Cf BRONAUGH, 1987, p. 217.
ela não leva em conta adequadamente um dos papéis principais das autoridades 
persuasivas, a saber, fornecer aos futuros tribunais razões para distinguir o seu 
caso das decisões dos tribunais anteriores. Sugere-se também que as autoridades 
persuasivas sejam melhor entendidas como autoridades teóricas fornecendo razões 
práticas. O artigo conclui com algumas observações finais sobre as consequências 
da visão adotada para nossa compreensão da lei em geral. 
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This parasitic account of case-based considerations which are not 
binding on a court, but are nonetheless relevant, is potentially 
misleading, since, as lawyers in civil law countries know very well, 
the former is in no way dependent on the existence of the latter. 
Therefore, to understand the role played in legal reasoning by 
persuasive authorities6 is not only a parochial question of the 
common law, but rather a general question about the operation of 
jurisprudence in general7. 
What is the role of persuasive authorities in the law? It has been 
said that the main role of persuasive authorities in the law is to show 
ways in which “the fetters of binding precedent can be slipped”8. 
But this is not completely accurate.  Although the word binding 
itself immediately conjures up associations with its literal meaning 
of being ‘fettered’ or in some way physically constrained to do 
something9, this is clearly not what binding precedents do. As Sir 
Carleton Allen stated many years ago, 
We say that he (a judge) is bound by the decisions of higher courts; and 
so he undoubtedly is. But the superior court does not impose fetters 
upon him; he places the fetters on his own hands. He has to decide 
whether the case cited to him is truly apposite to the circumstances in 
question and whether it accurately embodies the principle which he is 
seeking. The humblest judicial officer has to decide for himself whether 
he is or is not bound10. 
What this “mystifying”11 account of binding precedents tries to 
explain is that precedents do not bound in the sense that courts 
must follow a decision. Rather, courts are bound “to either ‘follow’ 
or ‘distinguish’ the previous court’s decision.”12 What binding 
precedents seem to do is to impose an argumentative burden on 
future courts13. If a future court is not convinced by a previous 
6  Although I am aware that not every persuasive source is a “persuasive precedent” or is 
treated as a “persuasive authority”, in this paper I am using these terms as synonyms. On the 
difference between them, see especially BRONAUGH, 1987; FLANDERS, 2009.
7  Cf LAMOND, 2010, p. 16.
8  BRONAUGH, 1987, p. 247
9  SIMPSON, 1973, p. 14.
10  ALLEN, 1964, p. 290. Cited by A. W. B. SIMPSON, 1973, p. 14.
11  SIMPSON, 1973, p. 14.
12  DUARTE D’ALMEIDA; MICHELON, 2016, p. 27. For the same formulation of the doctrine of 
binding precedents, see also SIMPSON, 1973; LAMOND, 2005, 3; 
13  I am grateful to Cláudio Michelon for this insight.





















































dictum which nonetheless seems binding, that is, if it does not want 
to follow it, then it has the burden of finding additional motives to 
distinguish the present case from the previous case.
If this is true, then the main role of persuasive authorities is not 
to show ways in which the ‘fetters’ can be slipped, but rather to 
provide courts with a motive for not putting them on in the first 
place. In other words: the main role of persuasive authorities in the 
law is to provide courts with reasons for distinguishing.
But what kind of reasons do persuasive authorities provide? And 
what kind of authority do they have for the courts deciding the 
case? In what follows, I shall engage these and other related issues 
by providing a critical review of Schauer’s influential account of 
persuasive authorities as having practical authority, and suggesting 
that a better understanding of their role would be to conceive them 
as theoretical authorities providing practical reasons.
The structure of this paper is as follows.
In section (2) I provide a brief account of the differences between 
theoretical and practical reasons and theoretical and practical 
authorities. 
The main part of this paper – sections (3) to (7) – is a critical 
engagement with Schauer’s account of persuasive authorities 
as practical authorities. Section (3) introduces Schauer’s idea of 
authority and explains his distinction between substantive and 
content-independent reasons by comparing it to Raz’s distinction 
between first-order and second-order reasons. Section (4) provides a 
critique of Schauer’s claim that the idea of a “persuasive authority” is 
self-contradictory. Section (5) develops further the idea of authority 
providing second-order reasons, specifying that these reasons 
are exclusionary or pre-emptive practical reasons. Section (6) 
explains Schauer’s conception of persuasive authorities as optional 
authorities providing pro tanto reasons for action. Section (7) shows 
how the idea of optional authorities is grounded on Schauer’s 
account of exclusionary reasons as including, after all, the possibility 
of considering first-order reasons. This account is compared critically 
with Raz’s views on exclusionary reasons. 
Sections (8) and (9) are aimed at providing an alternative account 
of persuasive authorities as having theoretical authority. Section 
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(8) is concerned with the shortcomings of considering persuasive 
authorities as having practical authority, and the possibility of 
conceiving them as having theoretical authority. Section (9) develops 
further this claim, by suggesting that there is no sharp separation 
between the two kinds of authorities in the context of judicial 
reasoning, claiming that persuasive authorities are best conceived 
as theoretical authorities providing practical reasons. 
Finally, section (10) provides, as a mode of conclusion, some 
consequences of the proposed approach. 
2. REASONS AND AUTHORITY: THEORETICAL AND 
PRACTICAL
It may be useful to begin by providing a brief and basic parallel between 
theoretical and practical reasons as usually understood in this context. 
In the standard account, theoretical reasons are reasons to believe that 
something is true, whereas practical reasons are reasons to decide or 
to act in a certain way. Although a distinction might be drawn between 
reasons for deciding and reasons for action – since “it is possible that 
I make the right decision to do the wrong thing”14 – they are both 
practical reasons in the sense that they are concerned with what one 
ought to do or what one ought to decide in order to do something. 
The distinction between reasons for belief and reasons for action 
accounts for another parallel distinction between theoretical and 
practical authorities15. Theoretical authorities are regarded as having 
some higher degree of knowledge or a certain skill that gives their 
opinions more weight than the opinions of an average person. In a 
word, theoretical authorities are experts in a certain field. When a 
theoretical authority uses his authority to judge of a certain issue, 
his judgement provides a strong reason to believe that what he says 
is true. This is because their judgements serve as an intermediate 
between the substantive reasons supporting the authoritative claim 
and the rest of us who are unaware of those reasons. Therefore, 
the assertion that p is the case by a theoretical authority gives us “a 
reason to believe that there are (other) good reasons supporting the 
14  MICHELON, 2006, p. 116. On the distinction between reasons for deciding and reasons for 
action, see MICHELON, 2006, pp. 114-117.
15  Cf RAZ, 2006, pp. 1032-1034. See also LAMOND, 2010, pp. 18-23.





















































truth of p” 16. As Grant Lamond has noted, p represents an all-things-
considered judgement: it provides a reason to believe that, in the 
balance of reasons, p is more likely to be true than not17.
By contrast, practical authorities provide reasons to decide or to 
act in a certain way. As Raz argues, “questions of who has authority 
over whom are practical questions”18 because they bear on “what 
one ought to do”19. When a practical authority commands us, for 
example, to “Be quiet!” he is not only providing us with a reason to 
believe that he prefers us to be quiet. He is also, by the mere fact of 
saying so, giving us a very good reason to be quiet. If someone dared 
to ask why he is supposed to be quiet, the authority may give him 
substantive reasons that justify his judgement, but, since he is the 
authority, he may rightly reply: “Because I said so!”. In other words, 
the fact that a practical authority commands us to decide or to do p 
gives us a reason to do it not because, in the balance of reasons, p is 
more likely to be the right thing to do, but rather because p is to be 
obeyed irrespective of its substantive merits. 
3. SCHAUER ON AUTHORITY: SUBSTANTIVE AND 
CONTENT-INDEPENDENT REASONS
In an influential article for the Virginia Law Review20, Frederick Schauer 
claimed that persuasive authorities are better understood as having 
practical authority over future courts. He also claims that legal non-
binding sources are best conceived as optional rather than as persuasive 
authorities. In the next paragraphs, I shall review what I consider are 
some of the most important insights in Schauer’s account.
According to what Schauer calls the “conventional wisdom”21 about the 
idea of authority, “the characteristic feature of authority is its content-
independence. The force of an authoritative directive comes not 
from its content, but from its source” 22. Authority “provides reasons 
for action by virtue of its status and not by virtue of the intrinsic or 
16  LAMOND, 2010, p. 19.




21  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1935.
22  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1935.





















































content-based soundness of the actions that the authority is urging” 23. 
Persuasion, on the other hand, is grounded on substantive reasons, 
which are always content-dependent, that is, its force derives not 
from the source, but from its content. Persuasion and authority 
are thus “inherently opposed notions”24. “The use of a source can 
be one or the other – it can be persuasive or it can be authoritative 
– but it cannot be both at the same time”25. Therefore, the very 
idea of a “persuasive authority” is self-contradictory. 
As Schauer expressly notes in his Thinking Like a Lawyer, the 
distinction between substantive and content-independent reasons 
is identical to Joseph Raz’s distinction between first-order and 
second-order reasons26. First-order reasons, in Raz’s account, 
are reasons to perform an action based on merits. They can be 
weighed against each other, and in cases of conflict “the stronger 
reason overrides the weaker”27. Second-order reasons, on the 
other hand, are reasons “to act for a reason or to refrain from 
acting for a reason”28. They are, as Schauer puts it, “reasons about 
reasons”29: they provide a reason to act regardless of their intrinsic 
merits. Second-order reasons are always practical reasons, that is, 
“reasons for action”30.
4. PERSUASION AND AUTHORITY: “INHERENTLY 
OPPOSED NOTIONS”?
Although Schauer claims that the idea of content-independence is 
part of the “conventional wisdom”31 about authority, the truth is that 
there is no agreement over what the source of that conventional 
wisdom – H. L. A. Hart32 – actually meant by it, and he has probably 
been misinterpreted33. And although Schauer has also claimed that 
23  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1939.
24  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1943.
25  SCHAUER, 2008, pp. 1943-1944.
26  SCHAUER, 2009, p. 63.
27  RAZ, 1990, p. 25.
28  RAZ, 1990, p. 39.
29  SCHAUER, 2009, p. 63.
30  RAZ, 1979, p. 17.
31  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1935.
32  See HART, 1958; 1982, chapter 10, especially p. 255 ff.
33  See SCIARAFFA, 2008. 





















































the idea of content-independence is “unlikely to be controversial”34, 
the truth is that some controversy over the issue does exist: there 
seems to be no clear definition of the idea35 and, more importantly, 
there seems to be no clarity as of what a content-dependent reason 
would look like, since it has also been claimed that all reasons are, in 
some sense, content-independent36. 
Now, even assuming the soundness of the idea of content-
independence, I still remain unconvinced about Schauer’s claim 
that persuasion and authority are “inherently opposed” notions. 
I believe he would need to prove not only that persuasion and 
authority are opposed when someone is not convinced by 
substantive reasons, but also that it could not be possible for 
someone to be persuaded of the substantive reasons because 
of – or at least aided by – the authoritative nature of the source 
providing such reasons. I think experience could show many cases 
in which we are more inclined to see the truth of substantive 
reasons aided by the authority of someone whose judgement we 
trust. Thus, for instance, when a student asks a question, and the 
right answer and the right reasons for that answer are given by a 
peer student, the first student would probably still want to know 
what the teacher has to say in the matter. And if the teacher agrees 
with the answer given by the other student and says so, I think it 
would not be far from the mark to claim that he is persuading the 
first student by his authority.
Moreover, there are cases in which the only substantive reasons 
are authoritative reasons. Historical facts are probably the best 
example of authoritative sources that are also used as substantive 
reasons. We are persuaded of, say, Napoleon’s historical existence, 
and the only substantive reasons we could give are a number of 
authoritative sources that say so.
To sum up: there are cases in which persuasion and authority are 
not “inherently opposed”: First, when someone is being persuaded 
aided by an authoritative source, and, second, when someone is 
 
34  SCHAUER, 1994, p. 499.
35  See MARMOR, 1995, p. 345.
36  See MARKWICK, 2000; 2003.





















































being persuaded because of the authoritative nature of that source, 
and there are no other kinds of substantive reasons available37.
5. A REASON TO EXCLUDE: PERSUASIVE AUTHORITIES AS 
EXCLUSIONARY REASONS
So what kind of authority, if any, do “persuasive authorities” have? 
As I will show, according to Schauer, if they are to maintain their 
legal authoritative character, then non-binding authorities are better 
conceived as having practical authority for the court which has to 
decide the case: they provide the court with a second-order reason 
to decide or to act irrespective of their substantive merits.
Authoritative reasons are a special type of practical reasons: they 
are exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons. An exclusionary reason is 
“a second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason”38. As 
Schauer puts it, authoritative reasons such as rules or precedents 
function as such by “excluding or preempting what would otherwise 
be good reasons for doing one thing or another”39. Exclusionary 
reasons exclude not by weight – as a strong first-order reason would 
do – but by kind40. Authoritative reasons are not “rules of thumb”41 
to be balanced against substantive reasons: they exclude those 
reasons from the deliberation process altogether. 
To be sure, an authoritative reason can count as both a good first-
order reason and as an exclusionary second-order reason at the 
same time42. As Schauer puts it, both kinds of reasons may proceed 
 
37  An anonymous reviewer objected to the reasoning outlined above on the grounds that 
Schauer’s point would be that a person cannot treat something as a reason of practical 
authority and as a substantive reason at the same time. I agree with the reviewer only insofar 
as that is Schauer’s point when dealing with authority in the law. I would also agree with 
the reviewer if it is conceded that, for Schauer, as for Raz, “authority is a practical concept” 
(RAZ, 1979, p. 10). However, in this part of his argument, he makes no distinction between 
theoretical and practical authorities. He expressly mentions that content-independent reasons 
are “reasons to act, decide, or believe” (SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1935. Emphasis added). Therefore, 
to show that authoritative reasons can serve as a substantive reason to believe that something 
is true – as I have tried to show by stressing the idea that one can be persuaded by authority– 
is, in my view, enough to prove the unsoundness of Schauer’s claim as a general claim about 
persuasion and authority.
38  RAZ, 1990, p. 39.
39  SCHAUER, 2009, p. 61. Emphasis added.
40  RAZ, 1979, p. 22. Emphasis added.
41  RAZ, 1990, p. 59.
42  See RAZ, 1979, p. 22.





















































from the same source43. Nevertheless, they remain fundamentally 
different, since they are reasons of a different order44. 
If so, how are “persuasive authorities” treated by courts? Do they 
provide first-order reasons or second-order reasons? This is an 
empirical matter. Depending on the case, they may be treated as one 
or the other, or even as both at the same time. However, according to 
Schauer, non-binding sources are usually used by courts as providing 
content-independent rather than substantive reasons: 
Although courts often cite legal sources because they are genuinely 
and substantively persuaded, many – perhaps even most – judicial uses 
of so-called persuasive authority seem to stem from authority rather 
than persuasion. (…) It is not that courts follow these optional sources 
because they are persuasive; rather, courts follow them because of 
their very existence45.
6. OPTIONAL AUTHORITIES AND PRO TANTO REASONS
When legal sources are treated as authorities, they must be 
viewed as providing practical reasons for the court deciding the case. 
However, these sources are not mandatory or binding in any 
meaningful sense. In fact, courts can ignore these sources without 
breach of duty. This feature of authoritative yet not mandatory 
sources leads Schauer to designate them as optional authorities. 
Although the idea of an “optional authority” may seem as self- 
contradictory as the idea of a “persuasive authority”, Schauer insists 
this it is not the case. “Even optional authorities can be genuinely 
authoritative”46. For him, there is no need for real authorities to be 
binding in the sense that they are “absolute or non-overridable”47. 
“Sources can also function as authorities without necessarily 
prevailing over all other sources, or even all other reasons for a 
decision”48. Schauer argues this point thus:
43  Cf SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1941.
44  Ibid.
45  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1945.
46  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1954.
47  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1952.
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The existence of an authoritative reason is not inconsistent with there 
being other outweighing authoritative reasons or outweighing reasons 
of other kinds. When a court rules that even the crisp rules of an appli-
cable statute must yield at times to the demands of justice, it is saying 
that an undeniably applicable statute is to be understood as prima facie 
but not absolutely outcome producing. In this sense, it is certainly true 
that most authorities are not binding or controlling in an absolute way. 
And the suggestion that treating some source as authoritative requires 
that the prescriptions emanating from that source must be followed, 
come what may, is simply not part of the concept of authority at all49.
In other words: the fact that an authority is “optional” does not 
mean that it cannot provide exclusionary reasons to act. Being an 
optional authority does not transform its instructions into first-order 
reasons. What Schauer claims is that the reasons for action provided 
by an optional authority, while still being exclusionary reasons, are 
not decisive, but merely pro tanto (“prima facie”50) reasons: they 
are reasons in favor of a certain course of action, but they are not 
necessarily sufficient to justify it. 
To be clear, to claim that optional authorities provide merely pro 
tanto and not decisive reasons is not to say that a case cannot be 
decided on pro tanto reasons. Quite the contrary: in the absence of 
countervailing considerations, pro tanto reasons will give the court 
reasons which are able in themselves to decide the case. But these 
reasons can be outweighed by other “authoritative reasons or out-
weighing reasons of other kinds”51, that is, by other second-order 
reasons or by strong first-order reasons.
49  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1953-1954. Emphasis added.
50  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1953. Following the common usage, Schauer speaks of prima facie 
reasons as a proxy for pro tanto reasons. However, a distinction may be drawn between the 
two. As Shelly Kagan explains: “A pro tanto reason has genuine weight, but nonetheless may 
be outweighed by other considerations. Thus, calling a reason a pro tanto reason is to be 
distinguished from calling it a prima facie reason, which I take to involve an epistemological 
qualification: a prima facie reason appears to be a reason, but may actually not be a reason 
at all, or may not have weight in all cases it appears to. In contrast, a pro tanto reason is a 
genuine reason – with actual weight – but it may not be a decisive one in various cases.” 
(KAGAN, 1989, p. 17)
51  SCHAUER, 2008, p. 1953. Emphasis added.





















































7. “TO LOOK JUST QUICKLY, IF POSSIBLE, AT THE 
EXCLUDED”: SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH EXCLUSIONARY 
REASONS
But how can a first-order reason outweigh a second-order reason, 
if exclusionary reasons are supposed to exclude first-order reasons 
from consideration? In Raz’s account, this would be impossible. “The 
reasons that can defeat them are those they do not exclude”52. An 
authoritative reason which can be outweighed by first-order reasons 
is not authoritative at all. Exclusionary reasons, to be sure, may 
differ in scope: they may exclude all or only some of the conflicting 
reasons53. But they do not change the balance of reasons. They 
exclude action on that balance54. For Raz, to say that a second-order 
reason can be outweighed by other consideration within its scope is 
to treat it not as an order, but as a mere request: “A request is made 
with the intention that it shall be taken as a reason for action and 
be acceded to only if it tips the balance. Orders are made with the 
intention that they should prevail in certain circumstances even if 
they do not tip the balance”55.
It is precisely on this point where Schauer distances himself from 
Raz’s account of exclusionary reasons56. For Schauer, a rule can be 
overridden even within its scope “by recourse to the very kinds of 
facts [i. e., reasons] the consideration of which the rule appears to 
exclude”57. For Schauer, the exception confirms the rule. For Raz, it 
destroys it. 
Thus, Schauer’s account of non-binding authorities as optional 
authorities relies on the assumption that exclusionary reasons can 
be conceived as “capable of override”58 by the very same first-order 
reasons which were supposed to be excluded. In what sense, then, 
are those reasons excluded? According to Schauer, exclusionary 
52  RAZ, 2006, p. 1023.
53  See RAZ, 1990, p. 46; 1979, p. 22.
54  See RAZ, 1979, p. 23.
55  RAZ, 1979, p. 23.
56  SCHAUER, 1992, p. 89: “Raz’s account of rules as including exclusionary reasons is largely 
consistent with the conclusions I have just reached. The primary inconsistency appears to be 
in the way in which Raz takes exclusionary reasons as incapable of override, claiming that an 
exclusionary reason ‘always prevails’ in cases of conflict with a first-order reason.”
57  SCHAUER, 1992, p. 89.
58  SCHAUER, 1992, p. 91.





















































reasons only exclude a “careful look at a first-order reason”59, but 
they are compatible with “merely a perfunctory glimpse at it”60:
Insofar as it is possible for an exclusionary reason to tell an agent 
to look just quickly, if possible, at the excluded first-order reason to 
see if this is one of the cases in which the exclusion of that factor 
should be disregarded, it changes the decision-making procedure 
from one in which the agent is expected to look at every first-order 
reason with equivalent care61.
But once the exclusionary thesis has been assumed, is this “quick look” 
at first-order reasons even possible? As Cláudio Michelon, following 
the lead of Emilios Christodoulidis62, has pointed out, “it is not at all 
clear how the thesis that formal reasons always exclude other reasons 
for action could be made compatible with the qualification that 
sometimes some sorts of reason (…) can defeat the formal reason”63.
I think Raz’s rejection of the possibility of a quick look at first-order 
reasons is a much more logical approach to authoritative reasons 
conceived as exclusionary reasons. However, Schauer’s account is 
psychologically more compelling. In other words: Formal reasons 
are problematic. But if it is true that one of the differences between 
using formal reasons (Schauer) and being a formalist (Raz) is the 
admission of exceptions to authoritative rules64, then it seems more 
reasonable to be a full-blown formalist than to defend that formal 
reasons are not so formal after all.
Nevertheless, I think Schauer is correct in stating that we tend 
to treat authoritative reasons as being defeasible by first-order 
reasons. But his strength is also his weakness, since he has 
implicitly recognized that, in real life, we tend to override second-
order reasons by first-order considerations. Since he cannot 
accept the authoritative nature of reasons for belief – hence 
his rejection of the very idea of a “persuasive authority” as self-
contradictory – he is forced to conclude that authoritative reasons 
emanating from persuasive precedents are practical reasons, just 
59  SCHAUER, 1992, p. 91.
60  Ibid.
61  SCHAUER, 1992, pp. 90-91.
62  CHRISTODOULIDIS, 1999, p. 231.
63  MICHELON, 2006, p. 135.
64  Cf ATIYAH, 1986, 20 ff.
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as binding precedents are, but with the difference that they are 
not mandatory, but rather optional authorities. 
8. FROM ACTION TO BELIEF: PERSUASIVE AUTHORITIES 
AS THEORETICAL AUTHORITIES
Schauer’s treatment of non-binding precedents as optional 
authorities captures a very relevant feature of persuasive precedents, 
namely, the idea that courts have no legal duty to use them. To put it 
in Hohfeldian terms, they have a legal “privilege”65 concerning their 
use. Whereas binding precedents must be followed or distinguished, 
but never ignored, persuasive precedents can be ignored without 
breaking the law66. 
Nonetheless, insofar as the idea of optional authority replaces that of 
persuasive authority, it also obscures some important features which 
are better highlighted by adopting the rejected terminology. I would like 
to draw the attention to one of these features: persuasive authorities 
admit degrees of persuasiveness, that is, courts usually consider some 
authorities as more persuasive than others67. Thus, in general terms, 
a domestic court’s judgement is treated as more authoritative than 
the judgements of a foreign court of the same hierarchy. In civil law 
countries, a Supreme Court’s decision is more authoritative than 
a judgement from a Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals from 
the same jurisdiction as a civil court is more authoritative than the 
judgment of a Court of Appeals from another jurisdiction, and so on.  
This is not, however, a fatal blow to the adoption of the idea of an 
optional authority. Arguably, degrees of persuasiveness may also 
account for degrees of optionality. The real problem is the idea 
of precedents as having practical authority which is embedded in 
such terminology.
There are serious reasons for doubting that non-binding authorities 
are best conceived of as having practical authority for the courts 
deciding the case. One major difficulty has been noted by Grant 
Lamond. He states that the “normal reason”68 for deferring to the 
65  HOHFELD, 1946, p. 36. See also BRONAUGH, 1987, p. 238.
66  Cf BRONAUGH, 1987, p. 231.
67  On ranking persuasive authorities, see FLANDERS, 2009, p. 68.
68  LAMOND, 2010, p. 25.





















































view put forward by another court is that the later court finds 
that view convincing. But in those cases, in which the court does 
not think that the view is correct, “what would be the reason then 
for preferring the persuasive source’s view to the court’s own?”69. 
The major challenge, then, to understand persuasive authorities 
as having practical authority lies in “explaining the rationale for 
deferring to a view even when it is erroneous”70. 
A tentative response to this challenge would be to say that there is no 
reason to do so. There is no reason to defer to the view of a court unless 
the later court finds the earlier judgement convincing. If persuasive 
precedents are conceived as having practical authority over the 
court, then the most reasonable way of dealing with ‘persuasive 
yet not convincing’ precedents would be simply to ignore them. 
As Richard Bronaugh has argued: 
whereas binding precedent must be followed (convincing or not), 
no judge could ever declare something as a persuasive precedent, 
then decide according to it, but express judicial regret over the 
result. (…) It would be inappropriate to cite a persuasive precedent 
as indistinguishable but unsound; ignoring such precedents seems 
the proper act. (…) Binding precedents may be cited as precedents 
yet followed without conviction; persuasive precedents may also be 
cited as precedents but are followed always and only with conviction. 
(…) No persuasive precedent is cited and followed unless it has been 
convincing to the court71
But this is not a sufficient response. To note that persuasive 
precedents are always followed with conviction would not explain 
the fact that courts normally tend to defer to an earlier court’s view 
not only to follow it, but also to distinguish it from the present case. 
Moreover, as Lamond has also noted, Schauer’s account does not fit 
very well with the fact that “judges do not write as if they expected 
their dicta to have any practical authority for other courts”72. 
Founded upon this and other reasons, he argues that persuasive 
precedents are best conceived of as having theoretical rather than 
69  Ibid.
70  Ibid.
71  BRONAUGH, 1987, p. 223-224.
72  LAMOND, 2010, p. 27.





















































practical authority. According to Lamond, the force of persuasive 
sources lies 
not in their carrying weight regardless of their merits, but as carrying 
weight due to the probability of their having merit. They provide a 
reason to believe that the view is a sound analysis (and so should be 
followed); they do not, in themselves, provide a reason to follow the 
view irrespective of its merits73. 
Lamond argues that an account of, at least, some persuasive 
sources as theoretical authorities makes sense of the way in which 
courts make use of persuasive sources74. In general, courts not only 
consider how convincing the arguments of other courts are: they 
also give weight to the very fact that another court has expressed a 
view in a certain matter75. Moreover, lawyers clearly believe that it is 
an advantage to cite persuasive sources supporting their arguments, 
and a disadvantage to have no such support76. 
9. AND BACK AGAIN: THEORETICAL AUTHORITIES 
PROVIDING PRACTICAL REASONS
I agree with Lamond in that persuasive authorities are best conceived 
as theoretical authorities. However, I would like to suggest a further 
claim: that persuasive authorities are best conceived as theoretical 
authorities providing practical reasons. By affirming this, I am not only 
claiming that theoretical authority can extend to matters of practical 
reasoning by providing reasons to believe that something must be 
done-77 I am saying that, when applied to practical matters, theoretical 
authority provides not only a reason to believe, but also a reason to 
act. In other words: Although there is a distinction between theoretical 
and practical reasons, that does not mean a sharp separation between 
the two. This point has been clearly explained by Cláudio Michelon: 
The apparently sharp distinction between reasons to believe and 
reasons to act collapses when one has a reason to believe that an action 
should be performed. Such a reason is itself a reason to act and this is 
a fact of the grammar of beliefs. To say ‘All applicable reasons support 
73  LAMOND, 2010, p. 17. Emphasis in the original.
74  See LAMOND, 2010, p. 27.
75  See LAMOND, 2010, p. 28.
76  Ibid.
77  LAMOND, 2010, p. 23.
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the belief that x is the right [thing] to do, but I don’t have any reason 
to do x’ makes as much sense as saying that ‘All applicable reasons 
support the belief that the cat is on the mat, but there is no reason to 
believe that the cat is on the mat’. (…) Although a conceptual distinction 
could be made between theoretical and practical authority, under some 
conditions, having one implies having the other78.
I believe that a judge’s reasoning constrained by binding and 
persuasive precedents takes place in precisely the kind of conditions 
in which the distinction between theoretical and practical authority 
is blurred. When deciding a case, courts are not merely concerned 
with providing exclusionary reasons to act ad intra, that is, for 
the parties of the case under their consideration. They are also 
concerned with the ad extra effects of their decisions, especially 
when those decisions come from higher courts79. That is, they are 
concerned with creating authoritative reasons for belief. 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
In this article, I have suggested that the role of persuasive authorities 
is better understood as providing the courts with reasons to believe 
which, in turn, influence their deliberation process. I believe this 
understanding of legal sources accounts better for the role which 
future courts actually assign to previous case-based considerations 
when deciding if the case at hand is similar to the previous one. 
In those cases, the court’s process of deliberation continues even 
when precedent binds it, and especially if it is unsure whether the 
earlier decision was right. When this happens, courts usually search 
for grounds to distinguish the present case from the former. It is 
precisely in this process where persuasive precedents, understood 
as providing reasons to believe that something must be done, can 
play their most important role. 
The proposed understanding also helps to rescue the very idea of a 
‘persuasive authority’ from Schauer’s critique. If the authoritative 
reasons given by legal authorities are conceived as reasons for belief, 
78  MICHELON, 2006, p. 122. Emphasis added.
79  For a clear example of this kind of worry about the secondary effects of a ruling in the UK, 
see the aftermath reflections by Lord Hoffmann, a member of the House of Lords that decided 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, a paradigmatic (and controversial) liability case in the 
UK. See HOFFMANN, 2012; 2013. 





















































then the idea of a “persuasive authority” involves no performative 
contradiction. Authoritative reasons for belief are aimed at 
persuading by definition. 
Although the idea of conceiving persuasive authorities as optional 
authorities rightly captures their character of hohfeldian ‘privileges’, 
it fails to account for the fact that there are degrees of authorities. 
The idea of a “persuasive authority” seems to fit better with the fact 
that courts treat some authorities as more persuasive than others. 
By contrast, it seems counter-intuitive to claim degrees of optionality.
I would like to add two final comments regarding the consequences 
of the adopted view for our understanding of the law in general. 
First. To recognize the importance of reasons for belief stemming 
from legal sources may lead us to revise conceptions of law in 
which “there is no role for persuasive sources except as practical 
authorities”80. This is especially true of those theories that conceive 
legal authority as giving formal reasons to act. The idea of theoretical 
authorities providing practical reasons to be weighed against the 
reasons of practical authorities challenges the view that authoritative 
reasons are supposed to exclude personal beliefs about morality or 
even about that same law from the deliberation process.
Second. The proposed view on persuasive authorities may also lead 
us to revise theories of law that account for a sharp separation 
between theoretical and practical reasons. I think it is precisely the 
insensitivity to the influence of theoretical authorities in our practical 
reasoning that forces Schauer to conclude that, since courts treat non-
binding sources as authorities, then they must treat those sources 
as having some sort of practical authority. In Schauer’s view, to claim 
otherwise would be tantamount to an acceptance that the personal 
preferences or beliefs of a court might prevail over the commands of 
the law, which would put in danger the very authoritative nature of 
the law. The proposed account of persuasive authorities challenges 
precisely this view, by suggesting that a reason to believe is not an 
arbitrary reason to act. It is a persuasive reason to do so.
80  LAMOND, 2010, p. 32. He is referring to Raz’s exclusive legal positivism. He also notes that, 
in Dworkin’s interpretivism, there is “no room for theoretical authority, because it involves 
giving a certain role to others’ views of the effect of legal material. But Hercules does not 
need anyone else to assist him in determining what the law is, since he is not subject to the 
limitations under which ordinary rules labor.” (LAMOND, 2010, pp. 31-32.)
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